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Abstract
The sciences of mind have taken a decisively embodied, enactive turn, exploring the possibility that
thinking may occur in action and not only in the head or the brain. The embodied cognition movement,
which first established itself in the early 1990s, has matured into a flourishing research program with
many branches. Embodied cognition has come of age. Even traditionalists who view this program with
skepticism admit embodied cognitive science is now a force to be reckoned with, one that: "is sweeping
the planet" [1, p. 619] and "has become an industry" [2, p. 1]. The main driver of its growth is a continuous
stream of empirical findings that provide "substantial evidence in support of the pervasive occurrence of
embodied cognition" [3, p. 80]. It is now beyond serious dispute that cognition is embodied in important
and surprising ways.
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Enriching Radically Enactive Cognitive Science
Daniel D. Hutto1
The sciences of mind have taken a decisively embodied, enactive
turn, exploring the possibility that thinking may occur in action
and not only in the head or the brain.
The embodied cognition movement, which first established
itself in the early 1990s, has matured into a flourishing research
program with many branches. Embodied cognition has come of
age. Even traditionalists who view this program with skepticism
admit embodied cognitive science is now a force to be reckoned
with, one that: “is sweeping the planet” [1, p. 619] and “has
become an industry” [2, p. 1]. The main driver of its growth is a
continuous stream of empirical findings that provide “substantial
evidence in support of the pervasive occurrence of embodied
cognition” [3, p. 80]. It is now beyond serious dispute that
cognition is embodied in important and surprising ways.
It is agreed that the mind is embodied. But there is
philosophical work to be done. Despite the consensus that
embodied cognition must be taken seriously, there is continued
disagreement about its nature. Three main frameworks have
emerged. At one extreme are ‘replacement’ views of embodied
cognition [4]. Replacement accounts characterize cognition as
essentially a kind of solicited organismic activity that occurs in
the form of sensitive interactions stretching across the brain,
body and environment [5-9]. Originally inspired by scientific
developments in robotics [10], dynamical systems theory [11]
and ecological psychology [12, 13], the basic idea of cognition
as embodied activity finds philosophical support from the
phenomenological, American naturalist and Buddhist traditions
of thought. The distinguishing feature of all replacement
approaches is their opposition to the mainstream view that
cognition essentially involves the collection and transformation
of information in order to represent the world; fundamentally
they challenge accounts of cognition that “take representation as
their central notion” [14, p. 172], seeking to move away from the
idea that the primary and defining work of minds is always that
of representing and computing.
At the opposite end of the spectrum there are ‘conservative’
accounts of embodied cognition that see no need for any major
revisions in our thinking about cognition. These accounts
attempt to accommodate recent findings about the role of
embodiment in cognition while still conceiving of cognition as
wholly representational and entirely brainbound. They do so by
positing representations with special formats that represent
features of the body, these types of representation play a much
larger and more fundamental role in cognition that was
previously supposed [15, 2, 3]. Importantly, embodied cognition
theorists of this stripe assume that the real work of cognition is
to manipulate representations in the brain, and that it is only such
manipulation which cognitively informs and guides what is done
or experienced. In direct contrast to replacement theories, these
conservative views of embodied cognition leave the mainstream
representationalist framework entirely intact.
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Between these two extremes are ‘hybrid’ accounts. Hybrid
accounts are unlike replacement accounts in positing sparse
inner models in the brain that, for example, do predictive coding
work. They assume that special kinds of minimal, actionoriented, representations play a part in this modeling activity,
helping to drive and steer dynamic and extended cognitive
processes [16, 17, 18]. Action-oriented representations are
hypothesized to be content-bearing states or processes whose
functional role is to indicate the presence of, and to sometimes
‘stand in’ for, states of affairs in order to guide and direct
specific kinds of action. Action-oriented representations are
interestingly different from standard representations is that their
vehicles need not be wholly neural and brainbound. This gives
hybrid accounts scope to assume that cognitive vehicles and
processes reach across brain, body and environment [19, 20, 21,
22]. In this respect, unlike conservative accounts, hybrid
accounts can put appropriate emphasis on “the profound
contributions that embodiment and embedding make” [20, p.
45]: they seemingly offer the best of both worlds.
This presentation will prepare the ground for an enriched
understanding of embodied cognition: one that will reveal just
how embodied it is and just how it is embodied. Ultimately, I
will argue that once unified replacement approaches, despite
some familiar objections, have all that is needed to do the
necessary enriching work.
In making my case I will highlight a recognized danger – call
it the Retention Worry – that many applications of embodied,
enactive cognition, (with headline cases in psychology,
psychiatry and sports science) are ‘missing the point’ [23, p. 1].
The Retention Worry arises for any account of embodied
cognition that retains too much traditional thinking about the role
of mental representations in cognition, for such accounts “fail to
successfully motivate any role for the body or environment, let
alone the one identified in the research” [23, p. 2].
The Retention Worry clearly applies to conservative accounts.
This is because those accounts regard representations as taking
up the entire explanatory burden, of playing the Complete role,
in cognition. By focusing wholly on the manipulation of internal
representations in the brain such accounts unnecessarily
complicate our understanding of how agents actively solve
problems in real time without providing any explanatory gain.
Worse still, such accounts obscure the ways in which agents
apparently actively and directly marshal bodily and
environmental resources in completing cognitive tasks.
It may look as if hybrid accounts can easily address the
Retention Worry. But that will be so only if such accounts are
right in assuming representations do play an important if limited
role in embodied cognition. Replacement theorists give reason to
doubt this, observing that: “despite the fact that one can cook up
a representational story … the representational gloss does not
predict anything about the system’s behaviour that could not be
predicted by dynamical explanation alone” [8, p. 77].

Although the replacement views completely escape the
Retention Worry, they face a counter concern – namely, that
they mistakenly fail to acknowledge the need for mental
representations. Hybrid theorists argue that in denying any
explanatory role for mental representations replacement accounts
are “unworkable” [24, p. 36]. Against this backdrop it is clear
that today’s most promising accounts of enactive, embodied
cognition pull in opposite directions over the issue of mental
representations. This topic is the central focus of this
presentation. Only by clarifying what, if any, role representations
play in cognitive science explanations will we gain a deeper,
enrich understanding of the nature of embodied cognition.
The Retention Worry raises burning questions: How much
representing is too much? Do representations play an
explanatory role in embodied cognition? And, if so, how much
of a role and what kind of a role? This presentation will examine
three possible answers: No role; Limited role; or Complete role.
Against the backdrop of the Hard Problem of Content, it will
also consider two different kinds of explanatory roles talk of
mental representations might play [25]. Mental representations
might be understood literally or fictionally [26]. On the first
view representations exist and play a part in causally explaining
behavior. On the second view, mental representations do not
literally exist but positing them may still play some other crucial
explanatory role.
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